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 The political developments after the 1990s, the establishment of the pluralistic system, 
and the need to guarantee human rights and freedoms set forth the essentialness of 
drafting democratic legislation and creating an appropriate infrastructure for the 
realization in practice of these rights. Among these rights, political rights take up a 
special place. To that effect, positive developments have been achieved. The approval of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Albania in 1998, the drafting of the Electoral Code, 
the creation of pertinent institutions for managing the electoral process are some of the 
positive achievements in the area of realizing these political rights, and in particular, the 
right to elect and to be elected. 
 However, the realization of these rights depends not only on the existence of laws that 
sanction those rights and foresee all instruments that will make possible their realization 
in practice, but also on the political will of political parties and of institutions that are, by 
law, assigned to organize and conduct the electoral process. Voters themselves play an 
important role in this process; they should not only exercise their rights, but also 
contribute to the conduct of free, fair and democratic elections. Each and every voter, in 
an individual fashion or organized into organizations or groups, may contribute to the 
conduct of elections in matching with the relevant laws and the required standards.  
 The experience of these years has shown that the Albanian civil society, and human 
rights organizations in particular, have played a significant role in the progress of the 
electoral process in Albania. Their contribution has been and remains necessary for the 
electoral processes of the future. One of the areas to which the civil society has 
contributed is that of the improvement of legislation. 
 The making of a new electoral code, drafted also with the contribution of 
representatives from political parties, was a positive undertaking of the Albanians to 
improve the election process. Any law is drafted so that it may be enforced, but failure to 
comply with it leads to serious violations of the freedoms and rights of individuals.  
 In spite of the progress made in this direction, previous electoral processes in Albania 
as well as the elections of October 12, 2003, showed that there is still a lot to be done in 
this direction. The lack of political will to contribute to as correct a conduct of elections 
as possible, the weakness of institutions and other electoral bodies charged, by law, to 
manage electoral processes in Albania, the lack of respect for and trust in institutions that 
conduct and manage elections, dictate the need to employ the monitoring of electoral 
processes by objective, non-partisan and professional observers. 
 The Albanian Helsinki Committee, the very first human rights organization, equipped 
with experience in the field of monitoring in general and of election monitoring in 
particular, has rendered its contribution to the improvement of election legislation, the 
acquaintance with and compliance to it in the course of election processes, the conduct of 
electoral processes, sensitizing the public of its role in this process, and has reacted 
toward the violation of the freedoms and rights of citizens during the various phases of 
the electoral process.  
 During the elections of October 12, 2003 as well, the AHC monitored the preparations 
for the electoral process and its progress. For the monitoring of these elections, the AHC 
engaged 106 long-term observers who monitored different aspects of the electoral 
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process. Many of the problems noticed during these elections originated from the 
Electoral Code.  
 Given that the AHC not only criticizes the violation of human rights, but also 
recommends necessary improvements in laws and practices of their enforcement, through 
this publication authored by its legal advisor, aims at addressing some legal problems that 
have a direct impact on electoral processes and on the respect for the rights of citizens in 
these processes.  
 The approaches to the problems presented in this publication have built upon the long 
and rich experience of the author of this publication, on the analysis of problems noted by 
AHC observers as well as on AHC’s assessments of electoral processes recently 
conducted in Albania. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the author of this work has 
been free to express his views and evaluations, independent from whether they are 
different from the views of other members of this organization. 
 The AHC avails itself of the opportunity to thank all of its observers for their tireless 
work, the staff of the AHC engaged in organizing the monitoring of electoral processes 
and in particular, the author of this publication for his contribution to the improvement of 
electoral legislation. 
 In spite of the different views that may exist regarding the issues addressed in this 
publication, the AHC appreciates the fact that this publication is a special contribution to 
further discussions about them in circles of lawyers and human rights specialists. We 
hope that this publication will incite debate and discussions about the Electoral Code, 
with a view to achieving its improvement and the conduct of free, fair and democratic 
elections. 
 The AHC takes advantage of this occasion to thank the Swedish Helsinki 

























On the author of this work 
 
Niazi Jaho, lawyer by profession, is a member of the Albanian Helsinki 
Committee and a legal advisor of this committee, board member of the AHRC and editor 
of the magazine “Human Rights,” member of the National Refugee Committee and part-
time legal advisor of the Assembly of Albania. 
The study of different issues of the constitutional realm, penal procedure and penitentiary 
legislation take up a significant part of his research activity. For several years, Mr. Jaho 
has given visible contribution to the improvement of numerous draft laws, especially in 
the field of justice, of the protection of human rights, etc. 
Mr. Jaho is the author of numerous articles, reports and speeches; he is a lawyer 
whose presence is noted through his critical views and constructive debates in seminars, 
conferences, round table discussions of experts as well as in the print and electronic 
media. The advocacy of constitutional principles, objectiveness and arguments, respect 
for alternative and even opposing views, all stand out in Mr. Jaho’s writings, as an 
unbiased specialist free from political leanings. 
For several years, Mr. Niazi Jaho has been engaged in issues relating to electoral 
legislation. With regard to the election Code of 2000, he was the author of two 
publications, the first one on the election of local government bodies and the second 
publication on the elections for the Assembly of Albania. Mr. Jaho addresses important 
issues relevant to the electoral code in these publications as well as renders explanations 
on disputable issues in this realm.  
This is the third publication in this field and it pertains to the new electoral Code 
approved in 2003. The work presented here and the issues addressed in it relies upon the 
experience of elections held in Albania as well as on the practice of the elections for the 
local government bodies of 12 October 2003. In addressing disputable issues, the author 
of this work, on the one hand maintains a critical stance, but on the other hand he 
expresses his views on the possible ways or alternatives to improve the existing electoral 
Code. 
This work may serve as material for discussions and debates that may occur in the 













The Electoral Code was approved in 2000, following the approval of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Albania (November 1998). The Code specifies the rules for elections to 
the Assembly, for elections of local government bodies and for referendums. In the spirit 
of and in matching with the implementation of the Constitution, Article 3 of this Code 
stipulates general principles: 
 
a- Elections are conducted through free, secret and direct vote; 
b- Any Albanian citizen, without any discrimination based on race, ethnicity, gender, 
language, political belief, faith or economic status, has the right to elect and be 
elected; 
c- Voters freely exercise the right to vote; 
d- Voters are equal in exercising the right to elect and to be elected; 
e- The division of constituencies (electoral zones) is done including in each of them 
an approximately equal number of voters; 
f- Any voter has the right to only one vote to elect an electoral subject or a 
referendum alternative; 
g- Electoral subjects are free to wage electoral campaigns in every legal way; 
h- Election commissions fulfill their functions in an unbiased and transparent 
fashion. 
 
The above Code, approved in May 2000, became subject to changes in May 2001, 
whereas through law No. 9087, dated 19.06.2003, it was invalidated in its entirety and the 
new Electoral Code was approved. As can be seen, the previous Electoral Code was 
invalidated within a very short period of time from its approval (May 2000 – June 2003). 
In our view, the main reasons were: 
a- Elections for the Assembly of the Republic of Albania were held on June 24, 
2001. These elections substantiated several violations and irregularities that were 
partially considered serious. 
b- Immediately after the above elections, on 12 October 2001, the press carried the 
final OSCE/ODIHR report1, which aside from noting achievements also emphasized 
some violations of the law. The report noted that the parliamentary elections of 2001 
created possibilities for a further consolidation of democratic standards, following the 
local government elections that had been held in October 2000. Nevertheless, the same 
report, considering the observed violations that came especially as a result of the lack of 
political will, made several recommendations that sought the further improvement of 
electoral legislation. Among others, it recommended that a bipartisan parliamentary 
commission (government-opposition) be established for that purpose. 
c- The project of changes that should be made to the Electoral Code were relatively 
numerous. For that very reason, it was considered more appropriate, also in terms of a 
practical employment of the law, that the previous Code be invalidated in its entirety. 
                                                
1 “Albania” newspaper, 12 October 2001 
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With a view to implementing the recommendations set forth in the OSCE/ODIHR 
report with regard to the establishment of the above Commission, the Assembly took 
three decisions: decision No. 15, dated 21.01.2002 that was invalidated through decision 
No.36, dated 16.05.2003 and finally decision No. 39, dated 23.05.2002, “On an addition 
to Assembly decision No. 36, dated 16.05.2002 “On the establishment of the 
Parliamentary Commission to review and implement OSCE/ODIHR recommendations on 
the parliamentary elections of 2001”.2 The final decision determined the makeup of the 
16-member Commission (8 from the government and 8 from the opposition). 
Although the commission was set up since January 2002, it was almost non-
functional until May 2002. It worked erratically even after May 2002, although decision 
No.36 mentioned above stipulated that the Commission should begin work from the day 
of the approval of this decision and would complete its work within 2 months from its 
establishment.  
The factors leading to this delay were several, but it is our view that they were 
mainly of a political nature. In fact, the commission did manage to compile the draft 
changes to the Electoral Code in May 2003, whereas the approval of the Code was done 
on 19 June 20033, that is less than four months before October 12 of that year, the date 
when the elections for local government bodies had been scheduled. The fact that the 
Electoral Code was approved with the consensus of political parties, especially of the two 
largest parties of the government and the opposition, has been considered positive.  
 Before the Code was approved, several ideas were put forth regarding 
constitutional amendments but they either did not find the necessary support or their 
review was postponed for a later time. Among these ideas, we may mention: 
1. The OSCE/ODIHR report, among other things, recommended that elections be 
held in one single round. Based on that recommendation, discussions focused on whether 
article 64 of the Constitution should be altered, with the reasoning that the phrase, “in the 
first round of elections,” indicated that there had to be a second round. In fact, this view 
did not gather support because article 64 of the Constitution (items 2 and 3) does not 
make a second round mandatory. As a result, elections done in one single round were not 
against the above constitutional provision.  
 
2. Political parties, especially the two largest parties, raised the issue of increasing 
the percentage of votes that a party had to get in order to gain from the name list. In item 
3 of article 64 of the Constitution, it is written: “Parties receiving less than 2.5 percent 
and coalitions of parties receiving less than 4 percent of valid votes on the national scale, 
do not profit from the relevant name lists.” 
However, this idea did not garner any support either. The following reasons were 
presented as arguments: 
a- Considering the conditions of the country, and in particular the level of 
political emancipation, leaving some smaller parties out of parliamentary activity through 
the above-mentioned percentage would make the two larger parties more predominant. 
b- The smaller parties in Albania would serve also in the future for the 
creation of political equilibra and possibilities for potential alliances, which would make 
                                                
2 Official Newsletter, no. 21, June 2002 
3 Electoral Code, special edition, July 2003, declared through decree No. 3868, dated 30.06.2003 by the 
President of the Republic of Albania 
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possible particularly the approval of laws requiring a qualified vote. They would also 
have a positive influence on the prevention of crises. 
 
3.  The smaller parties set forth the issue of altering the election system calling for a 
system leaning toward the proportional one. This proposal would require the amendment 
of item 1 of article 64 of the Constitution, which specifies that: “The Assembly is made 
up of 140 deputies. 100 deputies are elected directly from one-name constituencies by an 
approximate number of voters, 40 deputies are elected from the multi-name list of the 
parties and/or coalitions of parties according to their order.” 
With regard to this request, no comprehensive and studied discussion or debate 
was held, which would have served to present the advantages and disadvantages of the 
proportional system. Besides, in our view, it would not be advisable that such a major 
issue be resolved just on the eve of the elections of 12 October 2003. Nevertheless, this 
remains an issue that may be taken up at an appropriate time, presenting convincing 





CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE NEW ELECTORAL CODE 
 
It would be a mistake to ignore the positive novelties contained in the New Electoral 
Code that was approved on 19 June 2003. Such positive novelties would be the 
provisions that deal with the subjects of the principle of the inviolability of elections, the 
prohibition of the use of resources in support of candidates, political parties or coalitions, 
the appointment and duties of liaison clerks, etc. Of special significance are the 
dispositions talking about the meetings and decision-taking of the Central Election 
Commission (CEC), the acts of the CEC and their entry into force, complaints through 
administrative ways over decisions of electoral commissions and especially the procedure 
of their review by the CEC. It should also be considered positive that for the first time in 
our electoral legislation, the electoral college of the Appeals Court was created through a 
procedure specified in this code, thus relieving the Constitutional Court of addressing 
complaints that are irrelevant to it. The new electoral code foresees in a detailed fashion 
dispositions for a legal, balanced and controllable electoral campaign.  This is to be found 
in article 136 (The Electoral Campaign in the public radio-television), article 138 
(Schedule of broadcasts), article 140 (Monitoring of the electoral campaign). In the 
framework of changes effected, the CEC should set up, ten days before the beginning of 
the electoral period, a board whose duty is to implement the provisions of the Electoral 
Code on the electoral campaign in the public and private radio and television.  
The new electoral code also specifies dispositions dealing with the use of special 
forces and structures throughout the electoral period. It is known that the opposition 
voiced concerns over the implementation of this provision, at the moment when the 
Council of Ministers approved the normative act dealing with this issue. However, 
debates were leveled out later on also because the stance of public order forces during the 
October 12 elections was considered correct and in matching with legal provisions, 
something accepted by all political forces. 
Also important in the Electoral Code is its thirteenth part (Responsibilities and 
sanctions), which deals with the responsibility of persons charged with the administration 
of elections, the abandonment of duties by members of electoral commissions, 
administrative sanctions in cases when provisions of this code would be violated by 
members of the electoral commissions or by persons charged with duties according to 
this code, sanctions for the violation of principles defined in articles 3, 4 and 5 of this 
code, etc. 
Nevertheless, it is our view that some provisions of the Electoral Code run against 
the Constitution and its spirit, while there are other provisions that are unclear, inaccurate 
or incomplete and that, in practice, may be accompanied by misinterpretations of possible 
harmful consequences, something proven in the 12 October 2003 elections. We are going 
to pause on those issues that are significant in our view although they may be disputable. 
Considering the relatively short time during which we were engaged to address this 
problem, we do not pretend to present a thorough and comprehensive study. In this work, 
we have not included the provisions of the Electoral Code dealing mainly with the 
elections for the Assembly of the Republic of Albania and referenda, although, as is 
known, they are an important part of the Electoral Code. This would naturally require a 
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much longer commitment considering both positive and negative experiences. Maybe the 
next parliamentary elections would bring forth arguments to reach fairer conclusions over 
the other parts of this code.  
The elections of October 12, 2003, for local government bodies, although they 
marked a step forward in some directions, they also created some concerns that, in our 
view, have to do not only with the lack of political will, but also with some defects in the 
new code. In this regard, among other things, we shall pause on especially two issues that 
we consider essential:  
a- Setup, role and functioning of electoral commissions 
b- Voters’ lists  
 
 
1.1 Electoral Comissions  
 
Aside from the Central Election Commission (CEC) the local government zonal 
commissions (LGECs) and voting center commissions (VCCs) were also set up and 
functioned during the October 12, 2003 elections. The Electoral Code also foresees the 
establishment of zonal election commissions (ZECs). 
 
The Central Election Commission (CEC) 
 
The CEC is a constitutional body. According to article 153 of the Constitution, the CEC 
is a permanent body that prepares, oversees, directs and verifies all aspects related to 
elections and referenda and announces their results. Article 154 of the Constitution 
determines the makeup of the CEC. It says that this commission is made up of 7 
members, who are elected for a 7-year mandate. The Assembly elects two members, the 
President of the Republic appoints two and the High Council of Justice elects the other 3 
members. Membership in the Commission is incompatible with any other state and 
political activity. The makeup of the CEC is regenerated every three years according to 
procedures defined by law. The above article also specifies that the member of the CEC 
enjoys the same immunity of the member of the Constitutional Court.  
For the implementation of article 154 of the Constitution, article 17 of the 
invalidated Electoral Code determined the procedure for the election of CEC members. 
Thus, the Assembly would elect 2 members of the CEC based on the proposals by the 
Assembly Bureau, the President would appoint the 2 members following consultations 
with groups representing a broad spectrum of the society, whereas the High Council of 
Justice (HCJ) would elect the other 3 members through secret vote based on the proposals 
of the national judicial conference and individual candidates. All proposals and 
candidates had to be made public.  
The three above bodies (Assembly, President and the HCJ), in electing the 
members of the CEC, had to take into consideration the criteria (qualities of members) 
defined in article 16 of the invalidated code.  
The contents of articles 153 and 154 of the Constitution and for their 
implementation, articles 16 and 17 of the invalidated Code mentioned above, are 
completely sufficient to convince us that the lawmaker sought to create a CEC that would 
have the capacity of an independent, unbiased and politically free constitutional body. 
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Should the lawmaker have sought to make the makeup of this body politically balanced, 
that is to be set up based on the proposals of relevant political parties, he would have 
expressed this in the Constitution (in article 154). 
With regard to the organization and functioning of the CEC, as a Constitutional 
body, it is elected by means of a special law, such as the Electoral Code, approved by a 
qualified vote of three fifths of all Assembly members.  
Some political parties had raised the issue of the political balance of the CEC before the 
approval of the New Code. This issue became the target of discussions and debates 
during the drafting process of the new Electoral Code and with consensus all parties 
managed to approve article 22 of the Electoral Code in favor of the view that both the 
President and the HCJ should select CEC members based on the proposals of the 
respective political parties. In fact, several other issues of this code were resolved through 
consensus, although representatives of some slammer parties presented their remarks and 
observations.  
 It is our view that the contents of article 22 of the Electoral Code is not in 
matching with the Constitution and as such it should be invalidated. 
Article 22 of the Electoral Code says that the “President of the Republic appoints two 
members of the CEC, based on the respective proposals of the two largest parties of the 
government and the opposition” and that the “High Council of Justice elects three CEC 
members according to the following procedure: 
a- two members of the CEC are approved between two candidates proposed 
respectively by each of the two largest parties.  
b- with regard to the third candidate, the High Council of Justice shall pursue the 
following procedure: 
“The two largest parliamentary groups propose four candidates who are lawyers by 
profession. Each of the parliamentary groups selects two of the four candidates of the 
other group. The four selected candidates are submitted to the High Council of Justice to 
vote on not later than 48 hours after their submission.” It should be said that even if it 
were not like this, the political balancing that article 22 of the Electoral Code seeks, could 
not have been achieved for the October 12, 2003 elections as it would require a period of 
time relatively longer than could be thought or desired.  
The reasons why we say the above are:  
- some members of the CEC had been elected according to the invalidated Code (article 
17); their mandate is for 7 years and it cannot be interrupted only because, according to 
article 22 of the new Code, political balance had to be reached; 
- party proposals cannot force the President of the Republic, in appointing the 
members of the CEC, to select the person that would achieve the balance; 
- the HCJ is a constitutional body that is independent and that takes decisions 
collegially. It may be submitted (according to the law), party proposals but, 
considering the criteria determined in article 20 of the Electoral Code, (qualities 
required and conditions to be met in order to become a CEC member) as well as the 
voting procedure set forth in article 22 of the Code, it elects the persons it deems 
suitable, in spite of the fact whether they have been proposed by the government or 
the opposition.  
It is exactly this legal stance of the HCJ that spurred reactions and accusations against 
it, only because it elected a CEC member from among those not proposed by the 
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opposition but from among those proposed by the government. Initially it was said that 
the HCJ acted in contradiction of the party agreement between the DP and the SP, while 
it is known that although consensus-based agreements between political parties in a 
pluralistic democracy are not only necessary but also essential, unless they are reflected 
in laws, they cannot be mandatory for state bodies too. A while later, there were 
statements saying that the HCJ acted in flagrant contradiction of the law, article 22 of the 
Electoral Code, but nobody undertook any initiative to redress the violated law.  
 If political will, expressed in parliamentary activity, that is the legislative body, 
would accept or require the option of a politically balanced CEC, the need would arise to 
proceed by either amending article 154 of the Constitution or by invalidating articles 153 
and 154 of the Constitution and leaving the resolution of this issue up to provisions of the 
Electoral Code, as was done with other Commissions; although, in our view (as we shall 
discuss further down), it could also be discussed to not have these commissions created 
on the basis of proposals by political parties.  
 After studying the Electoral Code, it is our opinion that some other provisions too 
run against the Constitution. Concretely:  
a- The dismissal of the member of the CEC according to article 24, item 3 of the 
Electoral Code, is done through two thirds of the votes of all Assembly members. 
It is obvious that this qualified vote sought to equate the CEC member to the other 
members of constitutional bodies, (Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, etc.). 
However, the Constitution4 speaks specifically on the members of these bodies, 
by saying that their dismissal is done through two thirds of the Assembly, while it 
does not say anything regarding the CEC member. In such conditions, it is our 
opinion that the rule defined in article 78 of the Constitution, item 1, should be 
applied, which says: “The Assembly decides by majority of votes, in the presence 
of more than half of all of its members, except when the Constitution foresees a 
qualified majority”. Therefore, the CEC member may be dismissed by the 
majority of votes in the presence of more than half of the deputies of the 
Assembly and not by two thirds of its members. 
 
b- The Electoral Code also speaks about the procedure to be pursued in cases when 
the CEC member is detained or arrested in the act of wrongdoing (in such cases, 
item 2 of article 23 of the Electoral Code says that, the competent authority shall 
immediately notify the Constitutional Court, which may or may not render its 
consent). 
It is said in article 24, item 4 of the Electoral Code that the CEC member may 
complain about the dismissal decision to the Constitutional Court and that it is the 
latter that takes the decision whether the dismissal was substantiated or not. 
Seemingly, the above provisions were approved to equate the CEC 
member with the member of the Supreme Court as article 154 of the Constitution 
says that the CEC member enjoys the immunity of the member of the Supreme 
Court. However, the Constitutional Court cannot be added, through an organic 
law, competencies that are expressly defined in the Constitution. It is a different 
case with the members of the Supreme Court. The cases of detainment or arrest in 
the act of wrongdoing of a member of the Supreme Court according to article 137 
                                                
4 Articles 128 and 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania  
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of the Constitution should be addressed obligatorily by the Constitutional Court. 
Likewise, the same is done for their dismissal in cases foreseen in article 140 of 
the Constitution. The “argument” that the CEC member too ought to have the 
protection that the member of the Supreme Court has is, in our view, unfounded. 
The reason we say this is because immunity is the guarantee of inviolability from 
criminal prosecution without the authorization of the relevant body. This right or 
this privilege cannot be extended a priori to other cases mentioned above.  
 
c- The Electoral Code speaks not only about the dismissal of the CEC member in 
cases foreseen by article 24 (letter “a” up to letter “ë”), but also about the 
premature conclusion of his/her mandate (article 25, item 1, letter “a” and “b”). At 
first sight, these provisions appear normal and indisputable. However, we deem it 
necessary to address this issue not because the above provisions are in 
contradiction of the Constitution, but because the Constitutional Court held the 
following stance in one of its decisions:  
The Prime Minister of the Republic of Albania addressed the Constitutional Court 
with the request to invalidate, as incompatible with the Constitution, article 14 of 
the law No. 8270, dated 23.12.1997, “On the High State Audit,” among others, 
because the law also spoke about the cases of the dismissal and premature ending 
of the mandate of the Head of the High State Audit. The Constitutional Court 
accepted this request on the grounds that: “The non-definition in the Constitution 
of cases of dismissal or premature ending of the mandate, does not mean that 
those can be resolved through organic laws,” and further down: “… the law on the 
High State Audit, by limiting the cases of the dismissal of the head of the High 
State Audit or the premature ending of the mandate, which have not been 
expressed in the Constitution, has gone beyond the limits of the latter”.5 
In the same decision, the Constitutional Court addresses the issue of the 
immunity of the head of the High State Audit, which according to item 2 of article 
165 of the Constitution has the immunity of the Supreme Court justice (as does 
the CEC member that we mentioned above). With regard to this issue, the above 
decision of the Constitutional Court holds that: “Immunity has to do with the 
protection of a certain category of officials…and has as its element the 
irresponsibility for criminal offences and inviolability from criminal 
prosecution…”, whereas “Immovability in the constitutional sense is an element 
of guaranteeing the independence of the body and not of the immunity. It has to 
do with the protection against dismissal from duty of senior officials.” 
The reasoning given in the decision of the Constitutional Court that 
because the Constitution does not say anything about the dismissal of the head of 
the High State Audit or about the premature ending of his mandate, these cannot 
be defined in an organic law, does not seem just because, through laws for the 
implementation of the Constitution, there may be a breaking down and 
concretization of issues that are not expressly foreseen in the Constitution (as is 
the case of the CEC member), as long as those issues are not in contradiction of 
any Constitutional provision or its spirit. However, individual views or individual 
                                                
5 Decision No.212, dated 29.10.2002, of the Constitutional Court, Collection of Decisions 2001 – 2002, 
publication of 2003, page 206. 
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criticism of this or that judicial decision may only serve for discussions of and 
debates over this problem in the doctrinarian aspect. The important thing is that in 
this concrete case, in which there are analogies with the case of the CEC member, 
the decision of the Constitutional Court is final and mandatory for enforcement by 
all bodies, including the legislative. Therefore, before approving articles 24 and 
25 of the Electoral Code, the Assembly of Albania should have considered the 
above decision of the Constitutional Court. We would suggest that what was not 
done at that time be done in the framework of changes that may be effected in the 
existing Electoral Code. 
 
d- Article 154 (item 2) says that the makeup of the Central Election Commission is 
to be renewed every three years according to procedures specified in the law. This 
procedure was defined in detail in the invalidated Code6. 
The new Electoral Code, for the implementation of article 154 of the 
Constitution, should have defined the procedures for the renewal of this 
Commission. In fact, article 26 of the Electoral Code only mentions the word 
“Renewal” in its heading, while in fact this is not about the renewal called for by 
the Constitution, whose procedure, as mentioned above, had been clearly defined 
in article 25 of the previous code. What does article 26 of the new Code say? It 
says concretely: 
1. The mandate of the CEC member ends on the same date of the same month of 
the seventh year after his election. 
2. The new members who replace members whose mandate expires, according to 
item 1 of this article and article 25 of this code (this is in reference to the 
premature ending of the mandate of the CEC member), are elected not later 
than 30 days from the date of the ending of the mandate. In an election period, 
the replacement is done not later than 5 days from the date of the expiry of the 
mandate. 
As may be seen, article 26 of the new code only talks about the mandate of the CEC 
member and not about the renewal of the CEC makeup every three years. These are the 
reasons why we think that this provision needs to be addressed, also because the title 
partially does not match with the contents of the above article.  
  
Zonal Election Commissions (ZECs), Local Government Electoral Commissions 
(LGECs) and Voting Center Commissions (VCCs) 
 
According to the Electoral Code, all these three commissions are set up based on the 
proposals by the relevant political parties. This fact was used as one of the arguments to 
request or justify the creation of the CEC on the basis of proposals submitted by the 
political parties. The Constitution does not say anything about these commissions, 
although article 3, item 8 of the Electoral Code “General Principles,” it is emphasized 
that “Electoral Commissions foreseen in this code fulfill their duties in a fair and 
transparent fashion.” In reading the contents of the provision, it is clear that the law 
requires impartiality from all commissions, and not only from the CEC.  
                                                
6 Article 25 of the invalidated Code 
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The practice of previous elections, including the 12 October 2003 elections has 
shown convincingly that in many cases commission members have defended the narrow 
interests of the parties that proposed them. For the members of these Commissions, the 
highest authority has not been the law, but the party errands and dictate. This is a finding 
that was highlighted in the four interim reports of the Foreign Observers’ Mission (FOM) 
in the local government elections of 12 October 2003, as well as in the preliminary 
monitoring report drafted by the Albanian Helsinki Committee.  
For instance, the interim report 4, on the period 14-21 October 2003, by the FOM, 
says among other things: “The involvement of political parties in the counting process 
and tabulation of results was much greater than foreseen by the Electoral Code. The 
parties instruct their representatives in the electoral commissions at all levels to delay or 
challenge results” and further down: “The tabulation of results was interrupted and 
delayed in nine of the 11 mini-municipalities of Tirana. The Foreign Observers’ Mission 
observed intentional delays or obstruction of procedures by LGEC members, such as, 
blocking the approval of the process verbal of results, which requires a qualified majority 
vote. In many cases, commission members resigned or did not participate in commission 
meetings. Furthermore, the Foreign Observers’ Mission confirmed that the delays came 
mainly as a result of actions undertaken by LGEC members representing the opposition 
Democratic Party (PD)”. 
Apart from the above, it was striking to watch in the televised meetings of 
Commissions the political debates inside the LGECs, the party-oriented-disagreements 
among members especially in Tirana, the interviews of chairmen, deputy chairmen or 
members of commissions, before the electoral process was through, etc. Typical, but 
showing is the case when in the public meeting of the CEC, the candidate for Mayor of 
Tirana who did not agree with the procedure pursued by the CEC regarding the complaint 
presented by him, turned to two members of the CEC with the words: “On behalf of the 
party, I call upon you to leave the Commission!” 
These and numerous other facts, which are difficult to include in the framework of 
this relatively summarized work, make us raise, at least for discussion, the issue of 
whether the need is rising for these commissions to be set up not based on party 
proposals? 
We realize the importance of political will. We are conscious that in the conditions of 
a higher degree of emancipation, of an alleviation of the political atmosphere between the 
political parties, party influence on these commissions would probably be minor or better 
say less sensitive, but the reality ought to be assessed as it in fact is, not as we wish it to 
be.  
On December 2, 2003, the Electoral College of the Tirana Appeals Court decided to 
declare invalid the result garnered from 130 voting centers of the city of Tirana. This 
decision is final and mandatory for enforcement. We do not know the concrete reasons 
why the elections in these voting centers were declared invalid because we are not 
familiar with the reasoning behind this decision. But, of course, the Electoral College 
reached the conclusion that there were legal violations in these polling stations, which 
may have affected the result announced through a decision of the CEC.  
Violations of the law may have been committed by both VCCs and LGECs, but 
considering such a relatively broad area, it is our view that this is another indicator that 
the source of problems lies with the politicization of electoral commissions and party 
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interventions. Exactly the same thing could occur during the repetition of elections. In 
order to prevent that, we would suggest: 
a- The CEC, in carrying out its legal duties, through its structures, should follow 
closely and control the activity of Electoral Commissions in order for them to 
rigorously enforce only the law; 
b- Interventions of political parties in the activity of commissions should be 
prohibited; 
c- Vacancies in these commissions should be filled; 
d- Commission members should be retrained focusing attention especially on the 
provisions whereby violations of the law have been noted; 
e- Elections should be monitored by foreign and domestic observers. 
 
We would like to bring to the attention of readers that with regard to the proposal that the 
other commission not be created on the basis of party proposals, they could refer to the 
code of good practice in electoral issues, approved by the Venice Commission, on 5-6 
July and 18-19 October 20027. We emphasize from the very start that this is an opinion 
based on the basic principles for a democratic and transparent electoral process. This 
code and its explanatory instructions present the positive and negative experiences as 
well as the relevant recommendations. This code is neither the result of the study of our 
country's election legislation, nor a generalization of the practice of elections that have 
been held in the country.  
The reason we emphasize this is to highlight the important fact that what is 
mandatory is the enforcement of the basic principles of the electoral process, whereas 
technical-organizational issues and even those regarding the setup of Electoral 
Commissions, considering the concrete conditions of every country, may vary. 
It is true that the Code approved by the Venice Commission says: "Political 
parties should be equally represented in the electoral commissions…", but the same 
paragraph also says further down that: “or should have the possibility to observe the work 
of the impartial body”8. 
The code approved by the Venice Commission leaves room to also judge the 
other variants, starting from the Central Election Commission. Thus, it reads: “In the 
countries where there is not a long tradition of the independence of administrative 
authorities from political power, independent and impartial electoral commissions need to 
be set up for all levels, from the national level to the voting center level”9, whereas 
further down (regarding the CEC) it says: "It should include: at least one member of the 
judicial system, one representative of the parties that are in parliament, one representative 
of the Interior Ministry, one representative of the national minorities10. Thus, this code 
also provides another variant for the makeup of the CEC. 
 The code approved by the Venice Commission, with regard to the creation of 
electoral commissions, places an emphasis on the realization of the objective that they 
should be independent and impartial at all levels. Considering the practice of elections in 
                                                
7 The Code has also been translated into the Albanian language (34 pages) 
8 Ibid., item 3.1, letter "e", page 11 
9 Item 3.1, letter "b", page 10 
10 Ibid., item 3.1, letter "e" and "d", pages 10-11 
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our country, can it be said that this objective can be achieved through the creation of 
commissions on the basis of political parties' proposals?! 
I do not think so. Some of the arguments were presented above and it is therefore 
unnecessary to repeat them. In fact, it is worth-emphasizing that a more thorough study 
would bring about other facts in favor of the view that the Electoral Code, also in this 
direction, needs to be changed. Thus, from this standpoint, I would suggest that the ZECs 
and LGECs not be set up based on the proposals of the respective political parties.  
What criteria should be followed? Naturally, this problem is not an easy one. For 
instance, the testing variant applied for civil service employees could be practiced, but of 
course not identically. We are somewhat reserved to maintain the same view regarding 
the LGCs, not because they may be politicized, but because the number of members of 
these commissions nationwide is large (32 – 33 thousand). As a result, even the costs for 
their creation would be substantial. However, regarding the creation of LGCs as well, 
variants could be discussed to minimize the influence of politics on them.  
Endorsing the variant of the creation of Commissions not on the basis of party 
proposals or of politically balanced Commissions, we support the requirements of the 
Electoral Code that representatives of political parties be included in these commissions. 
In this regard, we also take into consideration what the Code approved by the Venice 
Commission says in that these representatives "should have the possibility to observe the 
job of the impartial body".  
 Nevertheless, we do not agree with items 3 and 4 of article 33 of the Electoral 
Code that talks about the representatives of the political parties in the CEC. It says: 
“representatives of seven political parties, which have the most number of seats in the 
assembly, have a permanent status in the CEC. They have the right to take part in all 
meetings held by the CEC also out of an electoral period" that "other political parties 
have the right to appoint not earlier than 150 days and not later than 40 days before the 
day of the elections and until the announcement of the final result, their temporary 
representative to the CEC." 
Following you will find the reasons why we do not agree with the above wording of 
article 33 of the Electoral Code.  
As such, we could mention: 
a- Item 4 of article 154 of the Constitution says: "Electoral subjects appoint their 
representatives to the commissions. They do not have the right to vote." It stems 
from this that in this case the Constitution uses the phrase "electoral subject" and 
not political party. 
b- Article 2 of the Electoral Code titled "Definitions" clarifies what "electoral 
subjects" mean. Item 25 of the above article holds: "Electoral subjects are political 
parties, coalitions registered with the CEC, their candidates as well as 
independent candidates in the ZECs or LGECs". 
c- Article 33 of the Electoral Code does not mention the phrase electoral subject, but 
"the seven political parties" or "the other political parties," which, as is known, 
total 60 in Albania. 
d- Article 33 does not condition the participation of political party representatives by 
a permanent or temporary status, but rather by the obligation of their registration 
with the CEC, which is referred to in article 154 of the Constitution. 
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e- Given that article 154 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania conditions 
the right of the political party to send its representative, when he is an electoral 
subject by provisions of the Electoral Code, they cannot be recognized either the 
permanent status or the temporary status at a time when the party that delegates 
him/her does not have or no longer has the status of the electoral subject.  
 
1.2  Voters’ lists 
 
Another concern that was observed in the elections for the local government bodies of 12 
October 2003 was that of the voters’ lists. It has been claimed that there have been 
manipulations in this direction, that thousands of voters were purposefully left out of the 
voters’ lists. That there have been serious irregularities in the voters’ lists is a fact. That 
the names of many voters did not appear in the final voters’ lists is also a fact. However, 
to date, competent authorities have not verified that this was the consequence of some 
criminal offence.  
 Considering the experience of previous elections as well, one may reach the 
conclusion that this problem ought to be looked at more thoroughly, objectively and far 
from politicization.  
Concretely speaking, it is essential to discuss the issue of what the population registration 
infrastructure in general and that of citizens who have the right to elect in particular; in 
other words, to discuss what the civil registry records and the fundamental registry look 
like, what do the shortcomings consist of, whether the existing legislation is complete or 
not. Besides, whether there are sufficient computerizing mechanisms that make possible 
periodical verifications and controls, what the role and duties of the respective state 
bodies related to this issue should be, what the rapport between these bodies and electoral 
commissions, etc.  
The preliminary interim report 4 on the period 14 – 21 October 2003 of the FOM 
of OSCE/ODIHR, among other things, says: “Inaccuracies in the voters lists were mainly 
caused by problems coming as a result of the civil registry records system, especially of 
the lack of a centralized system. Adding to this is also the hesitation of many citizens to 
notify the authorities regarding the changes of their living quarters. The Foreign 
Observers’ Mission also notes that the changes made to the voters’ list after it had been 
officially finalized, were done upon request of the DP, while further confusion was 
created at the last minute of defining the location of voting centers”11.  
Special significance is attached to the compilation of the voters’ lists in the code 
approved by the Venice Commission. “It – this Code says – is of vital importance to 
guaranteeing universal suffrage”12. But the very same code also gives special importance 
to the interest of voters. In that regard, the code says:  
“… it is acceptable that voters not be automatically included in these lists, but only 
upon their request.”13. The Venice Commission recommends: 
a- Voters’ lists should be permanent; 
b- They should be updated at least one time per year; 
c- The voters’ lists should be published; 
                                                
11 This is the final preliminary report of the Foreign Observers’ Mission (FOM) of OSCE/ODIHR. 
12 Code approved by the Venice Commission, item 7, page 16 
13 Ibid. 
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d- Voters should have the possibility to seek their correction, etc14. 
 
As may be realized, the voters’ lists are official documents of voters’ registration for 
every area of the voting center. A special chapter of the Electoral Code (chapter 2) speaks 
about the lists’ compilation and review process. Article 55 says that “Civil registry 
offices compile the voters’ lists, based on the documentation they possess in the 
fundamental civil registry records as well as in the citizens’ register with the living 
address in the respective voting area, evidenced as such until five months before the 
mandate expires,” whereas item 3 of the above article says: “The mayor or secretary of 
the Municipality or Commune approve and sign off on the preliminary voters’ lists.” 
It is this very list that according to item 3 of article 55 of the Code is administered 
by the respective VCC and is posted in every voting center. 
Based on what was said above, it results that the LGEC comes into the game (or 
starts to act), immediately after the voters’ list approved by the mayor and secretary of 
the municipality or commune is made available to it. Following the announcement of the 
preliminary lists, the LGEC collaborates with the municipality and commune to organize 
notification of every voter, thus creating the possibility for them to become familiar with 
these lists and to request, as necessary, their correction.  
The reasons for corrections are defined in article 58 of the Electoral Code, 
whereas regarding the right of voters to turn to the LGEC for the purpose of correcting 
the list, reference is found in item 2 of article 57 of the Electoral Code. The voter has the 
right to complain against the CEC decision, according to item 6 of article 57 of the Code, 
at the district Court where the LGEC is located. 
 It is a matter of fact whether the relevant bodies have respected or not the above 
legal procedure. It may be necessary for the problem to be addressed and the persons who 
have not abided by them to be held accountable in keeping with the law.  
What attracts attention and what we think is very disputable is the content of item 
3 of article 58 of the Electoral Code, which says: “The request for changes in the 
preliminary lists may be also submitted by political parties, electoral subjects and other 
interested institutions” that “In any case, requests should be accompanied by the relevant 
documentation.” That in the cases of the change of the place of residence or the place of 
stay, when the personal data is not accurate and when the voter is registered in the wrong 
voting center “requests by the above subjects should be accompanied by the personal 
request of voters.” 
It is understandable that political parties, electoral subjects as well as the other 
interested institutions should present their requests for the correction of lists to the 
LGECs, although nothing is expressly mentioned about this in the law. However, the 
important thing and what in our view represents the essence of the discussions about this 
provision is: who do the above subjects complain to about a decision of the LGEC?! 
Article 146 of the Electoral Code does not permit complaints to the CEC or the court of 
the judicial district in which the LGEC is located as they could not present themselves as 
representatives of a voter without this voter’s official authorization, i.e. they would not be 
legitimized. However, this is one side of the problem. The issue ought to be presented 
and resolved in principle. It is our view that only voters themselves ought to have the 
right to request the correction of preliminary lists. Besides, even if we were to accept for 
                                                
14 Ibid, page 6 
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a moment that somebody else might have this right too, it would not make any sense if all 
political parties (i.e. even those parties that were not registered with the CEC as electoral 
subjects), or other institutions, that nobody knows which they are, were to exercise it. It is 
worth mentioning that no line or sentence talks about such rights in the Code approved by 
the Venice Commission mentioned above, although special attention is devoted to voters’ 
lists. On the contrary, only the voter is considered a central figure both for showing 
interest in or registration, and even for the right to correct the announced list. 
What harm would that cause, somebody might ask. Why shouldn’t all political 
parties and interested institutions have this right? 
Such questions are not accompanied by legal arguments. Individual wishes or 
narrow party interests, although they may be understandable, should not give them 
attributions they have no reason to have; on the contrary, there may be cases that the 
rights currently given to them by the code in force may be accompanied by harmful 
consequences for the voters themselves, not to exclude the potential party frustrations or 
party-electoral commission conflicts. No legal arguments accompany these questions. 
Phenomena such as these manifested themselves in the elections of 12 October 2003. 
What was the procedure in fact? Until September 15, 2003, according to some 
incomplete data of the CEC, 4 electoral subjects, mainly the two largest parties, SP and 
DP, had presented requests for voters' lists corrections to the LGECs for 37,000 persons, 
while there were 2,160 such requests by voters to LGECs countrywide. Why was there 
such a big difference? Maybe the opposite should have happened. This cannot be 
explained only with the relatively scarce interest of voters (which cannot be denied), but 
also with the great zeal of the above subjects. But why? 
That no voter would be unable to vote?! I wish I am wrong, but we don't believe 
that it is like that. The political parties, in such a manner, have sought to guarantee more 
voters who would vote in their favor. We also do not believe that these requests included 
voters suspected of voting not in their favor and, furthermore, if they were convinced that 
the voter who was not on the list was a member or supporter of the opposing party in the 
electoral race. Isn't it a telling element when we hear that the persons who were left out of 
this list, or the persons who were included in the requests submitted to the LGECs for 
lists correction would vote in favor of this or that party?! 
Another problem related to this issue is the fact that the LGEC is not obliged to 
approve every request by political parties for the correction of the voters' preliminary 
lists. What is to be done? What actions are taken when there are refusals, even partial 
ones? 
The political party, for the reasons we mentioned above did not complain to the 
court. What about the voters, were they notified one by one about the refusal decision? If 
not, are the parties (even morally) responsible of depriving the voters of the right to 
complain in court? 
The possibility is not to be excluded that the voters, convinced that this issue 
would be pursued by the political parties, made up their minds and thought that their 
names would feature in the final voters' list.  
There you have another harmful consequence that may have deprived the voter of 
the right to vote. In closing, it is our view that this is a serious problem that is worth 
discussing objectively and by referring to the facts. What all need to do in the future, that 
is political forces as well, is to intensify concrete work to sensitize voters to show greater 
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interest in becoming acquainted with the voters' lists, and in complaining in court if the 
circumstances require that.  
With regard to the voters' lists, following the decision of the Electoral College of 
the Appeals Court on the repetition of elections in 130 voting centers in Tirana, an issue 
arose that in our opinion requires clarification and legal responses. Considering the fact 
that, as is being claimed, a relatively considerable number of voters were left out of the 
voters' lists for the elections of 12 January 2003, who, as a result, were not able to vote on 
October 12, it is being requested that the CEC, through a sub-legal act, should order the 
respective Tirana LGECs to add to the lists, based on the requests by electoral subjects, 
those voters who were not able to vote on 12 October 2003, so that they will have the 
possibility to exercise their right to vote on 28 December 2003, the day scheduled for the 
partial rerun of the election. 
In our view, this request is not legal, as the previous lists cannot be changed, in 
spite of defects that they may have had. (It may also be possible that there may have been 
inaccuracies in the lists for some voting centers where the elections were repeated, but 
also in the voting centers where vote results have been considered legal). Therefore, 
corrections to the lists would impair the integrity of elections, thus having harmful 
consequences and serious contentions. 
The CEC and the Electoral College, as is well known, have the right to declare 
invalid elections in voting centers, electoral units or the entire country. The main cause 
leading to taking such a decision could be a violation of the law that may have affected 
the announcement of the winning candidate (article 117, item 1 of the Electoral Code). In 
taking such decisions, the CEC and the Electoral College rely upon articles 109, 110 and 
117 of the Electoral Code and not on whether the voters' lists, for different reasons, did 
not include these or those voters, or this or that claimed number of voters.   
Reasons for changes to the voters' preliminary lists have been defined in article 58 
of the Code, regarding the phase of voters' list compilation and review and not the review 
of complaints regarding the invalidity of elections. The Electoral Code does not foresee a 
correction of lists after a decision for the repetition of elections, but only their repetition 
not later than 4 weeks. It is not an omission of the lawmaker that the Electoral Code does 
not foresee a correction (addition or removal) in the lists even after the decision on the 
invalidity of elections. From this standpoint, the CEC does not have the right to order the 
addition of voters who did not vote to the existing lists. Issuance of such an instruction 
would establish a new legal norm, which is not a competence of the CEC. 
We mentioned the figure of 130 voting centers regarding the repetition of 
elections. In fact, according to the CEC spokesperson, the elections are to be repeated in 
118 voting centers, (this was a material error allowed by the Electoral College of the 
Appeals Court). The CEC spokesperson, in response to the request for the correction of 
lists on which the vote of 12 October 2003 was based, emphasized, "Irregularities in the 




REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF 
THE ELECTORAL CODE 
 
1. Article I of the Electoral Code talks about the appointment and duties of the 
liaison clerks. This article says that the Apparatus of the Council of Ministers and 
the Prime Ministers' Office, all ministries, prefectures and municipalities are 
obliged to appoint a liaison employee and that: "In case any of these institutions 
does not appoint its liaison person, in keeping with the requirements and within 
the deadline defined in this article, then the head of the relevant institutions shall 
be considered to have taken over the functioning of the civil servant." 
In our opinion, this is solution is neither right nor effective, as it is hard to realize. 
Another procedure could be pursued to make possible the appointment of the 
liaison employee.  
 
2. Article 20 of the Electoral Code defines the criteria for the election of the CEC 
members. Item 2, letter “ç” of this article says: “the person should not have been 
an employee of the national intelligence service or of the state police during the 
past 5 years”. We consider that explanations should have been given for the 
approval of this provision. Which are the reservations or doubts? Why is it 
conditioned by their being employed in these bodies while it is known that they 
are depoliticized? The same attitude, for instance, should be maintained even in 
the cases when this or that employee has worked for 2-3 years in these bodies and 
has been appointed later to other offices, let’s say in the bodies of the prosecutor’s 
office, the court, public administration, etc.? 
We consider it necessary to mention that such an excluding provision did not exist 
in the invalidated Code. 
 
In our view, this problem should be seen in the aspect of citizens’ rights in a 
democratic society. 
Besides, with regard to item 3 of article 20 that was mentioned above, after “The 
CEC member should have not less than 5 years of work experience,” the text, in 
our opinion, it should be added: “in one of the following areas” (the wording of 
item 1 of article 16 of the invalidated Code was more complete with regard to the 
same issue). 
The reason we say this is because looking at the way in which article 20 of the 
Electoral Code is written, it is understood as if the person should have experience 
in all the areas mentioned in item 3 of article 20 of the Electoral Code. This is 
mentioned only for purposes of accuracy as it is in fact inferred. 
 
3. For the first time, the new Electoral Code defines the procedure that in taking 
decisions (most of the decisions), a positive vote of 5 members is required. This 
procedure is to be enforced in all commissions, beginning from the VCC to the 
CEC. The practice of the October 12, 2003 elections proved in an obvious manner 
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that this legal requirement was a blocking one and partially maybe even 
intentional. Therefore, we would suggest that these provisions be revisited.  
 
4. Article 27 of the Electoral Code. This article talks about the election of the CEC 
chairperson and deputy chairperson. Item 2 says that the CEC chair is elected for 
a period of 3.5 years and has the right to be reelected. The same holds true for the 
deputy chairperson. We think that these provisions need to be revisited. The 
reason we say that is because the CEC is a constitutional body and the lawmaker 
does not mention at all the election of the chairperson or deputy chairperson in 
article 154 of the Constitution. Should we refer to article 125 of the Constitution, 
which deals with the makeup of the Constitutional Court (the constitutional court 
is also a constitutional body), it says that the Constitutional Court is renewed 
every three years and its chairperson is appointed for a period of 3 years.  
With regard to the deputy chairperson of the CEC, although the issue of his/her 
election was raised a few days before the October 12 vote, it was postponed for an 
indefinite period. Seemingly, the reasons were of a political nature and the 
reasoning was that the CEC is not balanced politically. It is our view that the 
deputy chairperson should have been elected referring to article 29 of the 
invalidated Electoral Code  (although a transitory provision should have been 
anticipated for this). What is to be done if no “political balance” is achieved in the 
other elections either? The CEC will remain without a deputy chairperson, while 
it is known, among other things, that according to item 5 of article 30 of the Code, 
“decisions are necessarily signed by the chairperson and the deputy chairperson.” 
 It is our opinion that the above issues may be resolved with consensus, but 
in keeping with the constitution and its spirit (if deemed necessary, appropriate 
changes may be made to the legal provisions). However, seemingly, in the 
wording of the above provisions, the goal of having political balance extended to 
the internal organization of the CEC must have been taken into consideration.  
   
5. Article 34, item 10 and article 40, item 10 of the Code.  
In the first one, it is said that “the ZEC is reestablished in conformity with the 
results of the latest elections for the assembly not later than one month after the 
announcement of the final results of these elections by the CEC,” whereas in the 
second case, it is said that “the LGEC shall be reestablished in conformity with 
the results of the latest municipal council elections, not later than one month after 
the announcement of final results of the local elections by the CEC.” 
 We think that these two articles need to be revisited so that they will not 
remain formal. Such deadlines have not been fulfilled even before. In establishing 
such provisions, maybe our concrete possibilities and concrete conditions need to 
be taken into consideration. We are witnesses of the delayed constitution of the 
LGECs and VECs on the eve of the elections, also due to the fact that political 
parties did not respect deadlines for the submission of proposals.  
 
6. Article 80 and 81 of the Electoral Code.    
These acts deal with the obligation of the candidate to present the voters’ list with 
the signature of 300 voters (candidates for deputies), whereas for candidates for 
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local elections, the number on the list varies between 50 voters and 300 voters. 
Observers of the Albanian Helsinki Committee (AHC), both in the elections of 
October 12, 2003 and in previous elections, have found that no verifications are 
made with regard to the signatures of voters on these lists. This is the reason that 
makes us suggest that the provision should also establish the duty to verify this 
list, otherwise this legal provision would remain something formal. It is of interest 
to mention here that part of the Code approved by the Venice Commission 
dealing with the submission of candidacies. It reads: “The submission of 
individual candidates or lists of candidates may be conditioned by the collection 
of a large number of signatures” and further down: “The verification of signatures 
shall be subject to clear rules, especially in relation to deadlines” that “the process 
of verification should, in principle, be conducted on all signatures”15. 
 
7. Article 103 of the Code (Voters who are unable to vote themselves).  
It is our opinion that items 6, 8 and 9 of the above provision have remained and 
will remain formal, dealing with the right of voters who are unable to vote 
themselves and who may request their registration from the LGEC, presenting for 
this official documentation testifying to the kind and category of incapacity. With 
regard to blind voters, it is said that voting centers may be equipped with special 
voting tools, which would allow voters to read or understand the ballot and then 
vote in an independent manner.  
 The realization in practice of these provisions would match standards that 
we wish to achieve, but in the conditions of our country, this right or this 
possibility would hardly become a reality due to different reasons, as it is not easy 
for the voter to obtain the necessary documentation and then turn to the LGEC. 
Besides, he/she knows that he/she will be able to vote in the voting center, with 
the help of another voter, even without having these documents. Are we currently 
capable of ensuring the special equipment and tools that would help the blind 
voter to read or understand the ballot?  
 
8. Article 104 (protection of order in the voting center) 
It is written that when order and the orderly conduct of voting are endangered in 
the voting center, the VCC decides to suspend voting and seeks the help of police. 
The request in this case is submitted in writing and contains a brief description of 
the causes and circumstances, and that this request is signed by the VCC chair and 
deputy chair. We deem that in practice, there may be cases when a request by the 
VCC chairperson alone might suffice. This would refer to emergency cases. 
 In this regard, we think that what the Code approved by the Venice 
Commission says should be taken into consideration, “every electoral law should 
foresee the intervention of security forces16, in the case of incidents. In such a 
case, the competence to call on the police should lie with the voting center 
Commission chair only. It is important to not allow every member of the voting 
center commission have this right, because what is called for in such 
                                                
15 Code approved by the Venice Commission , item 1.3, “Submission of Candidates,” page 6 
16 This is in reference to forces guaranteeing order, that is security 
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circumstances is the immediate taking of decisions, which should not be 
disputed17. 
 
9. Article 140 of the Electoral Code , dealing with the electoral campaign with 
regard to private radio and television stations, says: “The CEC orders the NCRT 
to block the broadcasts of the radio-television operator…” and again further 
down: “In cases of violations, the CEC orders the NCRT…”. 
We think that such an order should not be directed to a body elected by the 
Assembly. Besides, the NCRT itself is not an executive body. It is worth 
mentioning that the NCRT, when it takes decisions as a function of carrying out 
its duties, refers them for execution to the relevant body.  
Therefore, this part of this article leaves room for revision and the CEC decision 
should be obligatory for enforcement by the relevant body for the execution of 
such decisions. 
  
10.  With regard to funds available to political parties (article 145) 
Considering concerns and delays observed in the elections of October 12, 2003, in 
our opinion this provision should be clearer as pertains to not only the distribution 
of funds in a timely fashion, before the start of the electoral campaign, but 
percentages should probably be also considered, especially in favor of the smaller 
parties. This would in turn create greater possibilities for a more balanced 
campaign vis-a-vis the greater parties.  
 
11.  With regard to complaints considered by the CEC   
It is our view that in order to facilitate and not delay this procedure, the CEC 
ought to have a clearly defined procedure (without hampering the right of 
participating parties to submit proof and claims), but prolonged discussions and 
frustrated debates do not serve the issue. Besides, we cannot make sense of the 
practice followed by the CEC, which without withdrawing to take a decision, its 
members take a position publicly even with regard to the validity or invalidity of 
this or that evidence, and vote, publicly again, on the final resolution of issues that 
are the target of discussion. This practice, in our view, has nothing to do with 
transparency. On the contrary, considering that the CEC too is some sort of 
independent court that acts collegially, it should not make public the vote of each 
member before taking a decision. If we were in a courtroom, parties in the process 
would have the right to call for the dismissal of the judge. Therefore, we think 
that in order to prevent the harmful consequences of this practice, the Electoral 
Code should mention that, following a thorough examination of the case, the CEC 
should withdraw to take a decision. Supporting this decision is also what is 
mentioned in item 1 of article 160 of the Electoral Code, which reads: “The CEC 
decision is always in a written form”. Could this decision be written in the 
presence of subjects that bring forth a complain, of the representatives of political 
parties and others present in the CEC meetings? Of course not. 
We also deem that the Electoral Code ought to expressly mention the right of the 
CEC to, depending on the case, announce partial results. This is in reference to 
                                                
17 Item 3.6, “Security,” 112, page 34 
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those cases when evidence is considered complete and incontestable. Naturally, 
this does not keep the relevant subject from complaining to the Electoral College 
of the Appeals Court.  
 
12.   With regard to the makeup of the Electoral College of the Appeals Court, 
Tirana (article 163) 
It is our opinion that what this provision says is not just: “each of the 
representatives of the two majority parliamentary parties and of two opposition 
parliamentary parties that have respectively the largest number of mandates in the 
Assembly, has the right to dismiss one of the eight names brought forth when the 
lots are drawn,” that “none of the other parties has the right to oppose this”, that 
“The procedure for the exclusion of names is secret”, that the request, without any 
exception, only includes the name of the judge without mentioning the causes for 
the exclusion.” 
It is a positive thing that the election by lots is public and conducted in the 
presence of representatives of political parties and the media, but we cannot 
understand the political parties intervening and excluding one of the eight names 
brought out of the box. We are not aware of similar experiences in other 
democratic countries. Ultimately, even this court is independent, it is part of the 
judicial system, although it has been established to examine electoral complaints.  
 We also think that even the swearing in, foreseen in item 46 of the above 
provision, is redundant. It is not necessary that a judge who has already taken the 
oath of office to swear in again. The second swearing in does not boost the 
judge’s responsibility. The contents of this provision cannot be justified with the 
fact that, in such a way, the trust of political parties is built in the judges who will 
be examining complaints by electoral subjects.  
Nor does it seem appropriate that, as item 5 of article 163 of the Electoral 
Code says, “The mandate of the electoral college resulting from these lots lasts 
until the decreeing of the date of the next election for the assembly, for which new 
lots are drawn”. 
First because the frequent replacement of electoral college members, in 
our view, would not serve the improvement of professional experience in this 
realm and secondly because based on the wording of the above provision it 
derives that the other lots may be drawn even after the decreeing of the next 
election for local government bodies. Therefore, it would be useful that this 
provision become the target of discussions as well.  
 
13.   Article 161 of the Electoral Code says: “The Electoral College judge may not 
be subject to disciplinary procedures during the period covered by the college”. 
We consider that such legal protection is not just as it places these judges in a 
privileged position in comparison with other judges. It would make no sense or it 
would not be justifiable to avoid disciplinary procedures on this judge only 
because he/she has been charged with the duty of handling complaints against 
CEC decisions. After all, these judges too are like all the rest. The situation is 
different with what is said in the other part of this provision on not removing the 
judge from his/her duties for reasons related to item 5 of article 57 of the law No. 
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8436, dated 28.12.1998, “On the organization of the judiciary in the Republic of 
Albania”, as replacements of judges of this court may be accompanied by harmful 
consequences.  
 
14.  With regard to the form and content of the complaint (article 169). Our view 
is that there is room for discussions on what is mentioned in this provision in that 
if the complainer does not object to the dismissal of the judge at the moment of 
submission of the complaint, then he has no more a right to object to this judge. 
Practice has proven that evidence that could represent a foundation for requesting 
the dismissal of the judge, could also be encountered later, that is after the 
submission of the complaint.  The same could be mentioned regarding article 170 
of the Electoral Code, which reads: 
“If he interested party does not present its objection within two days from receipt 
of the notification of the complaint, it has no longer a right to object to any 
judge”. 
 
15.  Item 1 of article 173 of the Electoral Code says: “The Electoral College judges 
and decides on complaints within seven days after the complaint has been 
deposited”. Considering the importance that short deadlines have on complaints 
related to electoral processes or complaints, we think that this deadline could be 




16.  Serious defects have been observed in all elections with regard to the training 
of electoral commission members . There have been numerous reasons for this. 
Among these, we could mention: 
a- their creation not in a timely manner 
b- their selection or proposals not based on their cultural, educational and 
professional qualities, but on the basis of their “persistence” or militantism 
in defending party interests. We would suggest that serious discussion be 
held about this issue in the future.  
This is naturally connected with the fact whether we will continue to work 
with commissions that are formed on the basis of political party proposals, or 
other variants could be employed to make them independent and impartial. 
Nevertheless, experience so far creates the conviction that more time is 
needed for the training of commission members. Besides, frequent 
replacements or withdrawals should be prohibited by law, to avoid what 
happened even in the elections of October 12, 2003. It would be natural to 
have exceptions.  
 
17.   We think that the possibility could be examined to define by law the cases in 
which voters’ complaints could be submitted to the court even after the 
announcement of final voters’ lists, but not on election day.  For instance, in 
spite of the request to correct the preliminary voters’ list, the LGEC has not taken 
any decision or has taken a decision after the final lists have been announced, etc. 
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It might be possible that complaints in these cases could be handled in court not 
later than 5 days before election day. 
 
18.  The issue of voting by Albanian citizens living abroad could also be worth 
discussing. Voting in the places where they are would be more democratic and 
all-inclusive. At the moment, this would be difficult to realize, but even with the 
current conditions, the lists would contain inaccuracies and data on the total 
participation of voters would be incomplete. It is also worth mentioning that those 
coming from abroad to vote, 2-3 days before election day or on the day of the 
elections could be deprived of the right to vote because of the inaccuracy of 
personal data in these lists, which should have been corrected within the legally 
established deadlines. We keep in mind the fact that voting commissions even for 
voters living abroad and who come back to vote are obliged to enforce, like for all 
other voters, the relevant procedures of the Electoral Code. 
 
19.  The examination of complaints on the announcement of elections invalid is of 
special importance. Item 4 of article 117 of the Code uses the phrase “interested 
person” and “competent court”. We think that it needs to be made clear as to who 
falls under interested persons and which is the competent court. Besides, the 10-
day deadline could be reduced to, let’s say, 5 days. Because of the very 
importance that the declaration of elections invalid has, the issue might be 
discussed as to whether in the cases of invalidity of elections in electoral units 
(especially in the parliamentary elections) or around the territory of the Republic, 
complaints against the CEC decision could be made in the Supreme Court or 
whether the decisions of the Electoral College in the above cases could be 
objected to in the Supreme Court as well. 
 
20.  We think that the Electoral Code could mention the competence of the 
Constitutional Court to examine and decide about issues related to the 
incompatibility in the exercise of functions of deputies and the verification of 
their election (article 131, letter “e” of the Constitution). 
 
* 
     *  * 
 
This work would have been more complete and more tenable if we would have become 
acquainted with the final report of the OSCE/ODIHR on the October 12, 2003 elections. 
We hope that this report will also present recommendations on further improvement of 
electoral legislation. 
In writing this piece, we also took into consideration the views expressed by some 
specialists and representatives of non-governmental organizations who were observers in 
the October 12, 2003 elections, at a round table organized by the Albanian Helsinki 
Committee on November 22, 2003. 
Some of the defects of the Electoral Code that have been mentioned in this work, in our 
opinion, have to do with the fact that it (the Code), not only before the drafting of the 
project, but even after the work of the parliamentary bipartisan committee, did not 
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become the target of discussions and debates by a broad range of specialists. As is 
known, the draft-code was sent immediately to the Assembly for approval.  
In our view, we need to draw lessons from this negative practice. And, in that regard, I 
would initially present the following suggestion: 
If the Electoral Code were to undergo changes, after the main directions of these changes 
had been defined, the Assembly could take the initiative to trust this task to a group of 
specialists with experience in the field and not involved in any political party. After that, 
the Assembly or respective parliamentary commissions could on that basis, assess and 
decide whether it would be necessary to make further improvements. It would be 
recommendable if this work were to start immediately and established deadlines to be 
rigorously respected.  
